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In economics, the positive impact of FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) inflows on 
host country is considered as an axiomatic truth. It is generally considered that FDI 
inflows bring along expertise, technology and required wherewithal that drastically 
changes the economic landscape of the host country. Theoretically, the calculation is very 
simple. Under neo)liberal paradigm ) inbound FDI fills the gap between saving and 
investment, and thus, augment the domestic capital that pave the way for growth, enhance 
trade and create new jobs, while endogenous models consider long run growth as a 
function of technological progress and support their argument by underlining the positive 
influence of FDI on long term growth rate in the host economy via technology transfer, 
diffusion, and spillover effects. However, the reality can be different depending on the 
prevailing circumstances and form of investment. For example the assumption that 
foreign)owned firms possess superior technology is less compelling when the host 
country is among the world’s technological leaders. Therefore, the positive effects of FDI 
can not be generalized, particularly when foreign investment flows from developing 
(capital scarce) countries to the developed (capital abundant) part of the world.  
 
In the last three decades FDI received widespread attention, however, the focus 
was limited to flow of FDI from developed to developing region or with in developed 
region. For example more than 90 percent of FDI inflow in the US originates from 
Europe, North America and Japan while the rest of world contributes less than 10 percent 
to FDI inflows in the US and that the share of China in overall FDI inflows in the US is 
only 0.6 percent. However, irrespective of small share, Chinese FDI in the US recently 
received negative and out of proportion attention which has yet to subside.  
 
China is growing rapidly and like any other country, for China the most important 
thing is to keep the chain of supply intact and the wheels of growth turning. This is not 
possible without ‘going out globally’ and integrating herself in the world economy. The 
recent trend in Chinese outbound investment across the globe is a step in that direction. 
The growing confidence of Chinese firms on local level and their urge to go out globally 
(supported by huge pile of China’s foreign exchange reserves and more than 7 percent 
growth rate) indicates that in the coming years Chinese firm will invest more 
aggressively, particularly in the US. Huge US market and sophisticated latest technology 
have great attraction for foreign investors and Chinese firms are no exception. Similarly, 
infrastructure, level of financial development, skilled labor, R&D, technical know how 
(Hymer 1976) and testing waters and acquiring credibility are some of the other plausible 
reasons that explain the interest of Chinese investors in the US1.  
 
Chinese outbound investment is a recent phenomenon that can be traced back to 
‘Going out Strategy’ initiated Chinese government in 1999. Since then Chinese 
investment across the globe and particularly in the US increased steadily where it jumped 
from $.4 billion in 2002 to $ 6.5 billion by 2012. Chinese investment in the US increased 
by 70 percent after 2008 to 2011. Though the stock of Chinese FDI in the US is mere 0.3 
percent, almost negligible when compared with Chinese investment in treasury and 
sovereign wealth fund in the US, still the US government is skeptical of Chinese FDI. 
One recent example is the presidential intervention in a deal between Sany and Ralls 
Corporation. US government is concerned that China state owned firms and industrial 
policy might lead her firms to acquire assets overseas only to move jobs and production 
back home, and therefore, in the long run Chinese investments will harm rather than help 
local employment and growth. This raise question about the integrity and contribution of 
                                                 
1 China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, European Commission, and UNCTAD (2010) 
“Survey on Current Conditions and Intention of Outbound Investment by Chinese Enterprises,” 
Chinese direct investment in the US and has rekindled old fears about the political and 
economic impacts of FDI.  
 
Thus, this paper is an effort to analyze qualitative and quantitative impact of 
Chinese outbound investment on the selected states of the US that receive Chinese FDI. 
We want to measure the impact and causal relation of Chinese outbound investment on 
growth, employment and exports in the selected US States. This will help us understand 
the motives and the role of Chinese investment in the US economy as well as the harsh 
response of the US to FDI of Chinese origin.   
 
The rest of the paper is divided as: section 2 consists of literature review, section 
3 deals with descriptive analysis of Chinese outbound investment in the US, section 4 
deals with data and methodology while section 5 discusses empirical results. Last section 
concludes the paper.  
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The empirical literature on FDI and economic growth can be broadly classified 
into two parts: (i) The considerable direct impact of FDI on trade that ultimately increases 
growth (Markussen and Vernables, 1998) and (ii) the role of FDI in stimulating and 
enhancing the productivity of domestic firms (Borensztein et al., 1998). In the first case, 
macro economic studies, unlike the microeconomic empirical evidence, generally suggest 
positive role of FDI in generating economic activities that attracted widespread attention 
from scholars in the fields of international business and world economy (Barry and 
Bradley, 1997; Glass and Kamal, 1999; Mortimore, 2000; Hunya, 2002; Girma et al., 
2005). These scholars identified a number of channels, including augmenting capital 
stock, technology transfer, learning by watching, and complementary inputs etc. through 
which FDI contribute to growth and development of host economies. 
  
 Ekhardt et al (2009) shows that FDI inflows to the US demonstrate more positive 
externality compared to domestic investment. Empirical evidence also confirms that US 
have advantage in utilizing FDI compared to other advanced states where agglomeration 
economies can be reaped (Head, Ries and Swenson 1995; Bobonis and Shatz 2007). 
Dunning (1999) argue that the type of inbound FDI in advanced economies, such as the 
US, is different than their investment in developing economies. US attract asset seeking 
rather than asset exploiting type of FDI where asset seeking FDI is motivated by the 
investing company’s search for knowledge and technology (Cantwell 1989) that are not 
available locally. 
 
Driffield and Taylor (2002) argued that the impact of FDI is greater across 
developed countries where the domestic and foreign firms have nearly same level of 
productivity, while other studies underscore the importance of human capital, per capita 
income, the role of financial development and trade openness for the positive spillover of 
FDI (Borenzstien et al. 1998, Blomstrom et al. 1994, Alfaro et al. 2003, 
Balasubramanyam et al. 1996). Alfaro et al. (2003) consider that the positive effect of 
FDI depends on a well established capital markets, while other consider that trade 
openness is an important channel through which FDI can affect growth favorably 
(Balasubramanyam et al. 1996). Choe (2003) adapts a panel VAR model to explore the 
interaction between FDI and economic growth in eighty countries in the period from 
1971)1995. He confirmed the Granger causality relationship between FDI and economic 
growth in either direction but with stronger effects visible from economic growth to FDI 
than the other way around. Xiaohuai et al. (2002) using quarterly data for China found 
co)integration as well as bidirectional short and long run causality between FDI and 
growth. 
 
Chowdhury and Mavrotas (2003)De Mello (1999)Nair)Reichert and Weinhold (2001) 
emphasize heterogeneity and tested causality  for cross country panels by using mixed fixed 
and random (MFR) coefficient approach in order to test the impact of FDI on growth and 
found that FDI on average shows significant relation with growth, although the relationship is 
highly heterogeneous across countries. Using heterogeneous panel Hansen and Rand (2004) 
and Mahmoud and Fatima (2007) confirmed two)way causality between FDI and the 
level of GDP for a sample of 31 developing and six Gulf countries, respectively. Their 
results support the role of FDI in growth via knowledge transfers and adoption of new 
technology. The main exception from these general conclusions is Carkovic and Levine 
(2002). 
 
However, Krugman (1998) doubts the benefits associated with foreign investment 
and acquisition of domestic firms due to adverse selection problem, particularly at the 
time of financial crises where foreigners can take advantage of liquidity constraints and 
the domestic assets are on ‘fire sale’. FDI undertaken in such situation may transfer 
ownership of firms from domestic to foreign firms that are less efficient, since foreigners 
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acquire local firms because of their superior cash position as opposed to a special know)
how or technological advantages. 
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The structure of Chinese economy is different from the US where US is the stanch 
follower of free market while china believes in social market economy. In China state 
owned enterprises compared to private firms are traditionally strong and had easy access 
to finances. State owned enterprises dominated Chinese economy for long time even after 
open)up policy and remained main investors within and outside the country. But in the 
last ten years the share and number of state owned enterprises decreased and they faced 
stiff competition from domestic and international investors. Recently this trend is clear 
from China’s FDI in the US where the number of state owned investment projects 
reduced to half that of private investment projects.2  Similarly, the value of Chinese 
private investment in the US is on rise. In 2012, for the first time, the value of private 
investment was more than the total investment of Chinese state owned firms in the US. 
 
Globally US is the most 
attractive country for FDI that 
lured more than $ 2 trillion 
investment in a period of eleven 
years from 2000 to 2011. 
                                                 
2 http://rhg.com/notes/chinese)fdi)in)the)united)states)q1)2013)update 
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However, the share of Chinese FDI in the said stock is mere 0.37 percent (Fig 1). From 
2000 to 2008, the accumulated direct Chinese investment in the US was just $ 4.3 billion 
that surged to $ 17 billion by 2012.  This shows that contrary to global trend, the pace of 
Chinese investment to US picked momentum just after 2008. By one estimate, Chinese 
FDI in the US is a source of more than 250003 employments with average compensation 
of employees is 20 percent higher than the domestic firms. Similarly, Chinese FDI 
contribution to exports was $121 million in 2009, which is four fold higher than 2008.  

 Structural changes at home encourage Chinese firms to find their prospects by 
directly investing in developed economies. Thus acquiring rich)world brands and 
technologies, learning how to operate under advanced regulatory regimes, and gaining 
experience in providing higher value)added services are now part of the diverse mix of 
motives drawing China’s firms to the US. Chinese firms have finances but majority of 
them are investing abroad for the first time. Therefore, they prefer to collaborate with the 
local firms. By 2011 the 
accumulated Chinese 
investment in the US M&A 
was $ 13.5 billion compared to 
$ 2.8 billion in Greenfield 
investment (Fig 2). The number 
of deals in M&A is on rise and 
this shows that many firms 
                                                 
3 http://rhg.com/articles/the)employment)impacts)of)chinese)investment)in)the)united)states 
from China are aspiring to join hands with a partner in the US, while firms in the US 
going through a troubled time and anticipating China’s economic rise, welcome Chinese 
investment.  
 
Empirical evidence supports the argument that Greenfield investment generates 
more jobs compared to M&A. However, M&A played equally important role in 
maintaining jobs in the US after the 2008 crisis. M&A saved several troubled US firms 
from bankruptcy and successfully turned them productive. As human talent, experience 
and know how are rooted locally and not prone to easy transfers, therefore, Chinese 
buyers depended on local staff (e.g Lenovo overtake of IBM) after acquiring a US 
business. M&A by Chinese firms also provides synergies with existing operations and 
opened the venues for partners to access market, cheap input materials and economies of 
scale in manufacturing in China. Chinese investment in the US by States is Sporadic and 
the bulk of investment is concentrated to a few States rich in energy resources, advance 
industrial asset and latest technology e.g Texas and California. This pattern of Chinese 
FDI corroborates earlier studies according to which US advanced States, where 
agglomeration economies could be reaped, attract more inbound FDI (Coughlin et al. 
1991; Head et al. 1995; Bobonis and Shatz 2007) 
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The usual first step in empirical testing in temporal data is stationarity test. 
Traditional tests in this regard are ADF (Augmented Dickey and Fuller) and P.P (Philip 
Pearson) tests. However, the ADF and P.P tests are originally meant for single time series 
and may suffer from low statistical power in unbalanced panels and small samples like 
ours. Therefore, in our case we rely on IPS (Im, Pesaran, Shin ,2003) and Fisher Chi 
based panel unit root tests. IPS test can be described as  
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The null hypothesis for IPS panel unit root test is  
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 The alternative hypothesis allows some (but not all) of the individuals to 
have unit roots. IPS deals with the weaknesses of ADF  by taking averages of the ADF 
individual unit root test statistics for each of the cross sectional unites ‘i’ in the panel and 
therefore can be applied to balanced as well as unbalance panel data. Equation 4.1 
considers unobserved effects and heterogeneous time trend when it is testing for panel 
unit roots at level. In case our test fails to reject the null at level, we move to test for a 
unit root in 1st difference.  
 Similarly, the Fisher)type test uses p)values from unit root test for each cross)section i 
and take the following form. 
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which has a χ2 distribution with 2N degrees of freedom. The null and alternative 
hypotheses of Fisher tests are the same as in the IPS test. 
 
 Determining the order of integration helps tackle the spurious relation among the 
dependent and explanatory variables on one hand and provide information whether long 
run relation i.e. co)integration among the variables of interest can be tested or not, on the 
other. If the variables are of same order of integration and none of the control variables is 
of a higher order of integration than that of dependent variables, then co)integration 
analysis is applicable, otherwise not.  
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We assume that the relationship between FDI and growth (exports and 
employment) is linear and given by  
 
4$)& φβα ++=                                          (4.5) 
 
Where SGDP is the log values of US States GDP while CFDI is the log values of Chinese 
outbound investment in the selected US states and Z is the set of conditioning 
information to control for other factors associated with economic growth 
 
For heterogenous panel data, the model may be described as  
 



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Where i=1,2, )))), N and t=1,2,)))), T 
N refers to the number of countries and T refers to the number of over time for 
States in the panel, while α is country specific intercept or fixed effect parameter. We will 
extend the same model to capture the impact of Chinese FDI (CFDI) on employment and 
exports by replacing SGDP with Ump (employment level) and SXT (exports) and by 
altering the variables in Z accordingly.  
 
The vector of other explanatory variables (Z) associated with the economic 
growth, employment and exports of States can be divided into two categories: internal 
and external. Internal variables include wage rates (Wr) and employment level (Ump) 
while external variables include the world GDP minus US GDP (WWS), States total 
export (SXT). Thus for GDP, employment and export we devise three models from 4.7 to 
4.9 as  
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In order to capture the impact of Chinese FDI in combination with States exports 
to China, we will replace SXT with XTMC (States total export minus export to China) 
and CFDI with FXC (interaction variable of Chinese export with Chinese FDI in States). 
Similarly we hypothesize that the impact of Chinese investment in the US States, 
1β ′ ,  in 
4.10  is the function of export to China i.e. 



 $5511 βββ +=′  
 




 4$)& εφβα +++= ´      (4.10) 
 
Replacing 
1β ′  and variables of vector of Z as we did in equation 4.7, we get the 
following  
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                                                                                                                       (4.11) 
This gives us a model that includes the path of FDI impact both individually as 
well as interactively. Now to analyze the causal relation between SGDP, and CFDI, we 
convert our models to dynamic panel form by presenting the dependent variables as a 
function of lags of itself and other right hand side variables in equation 4.11. (Same 
process is employed for dynamic panel form for Ump and SXT, however with different 
Vector of explanatory variables) 
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Following Nair)Reichert and Weinhold (2001), we orthogonalize the candidate 
causal variables (CFDI) after the linear influences of the remaining right)hand side 
variables have been taken into account 
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 It is important to mention that Chinese outbound investment in US is a recent 
phenomenon and the flow is sporadic on State level, and for that reason we include those 
States in our study who received Chinese foreign investment at least for half of the time 
period (Appendix table 1). Similarly, table 2(Appendix) illustrates the nature and source 
of data. We consider the role of Chinese out bound FDI (CFDI), State GDP (SGDP), 
States total exports (SXT) and level of employment (Ump) along with World GDP minus 
US GDP (WWS) and States wage rate (Wr) as variables of interest. Similarly we devised 
XTMC (States total exports minus exports to China) and FXC (which is an interaction 
variable of Chinese outbound investment to US states and US States export to China) by 
using simple arithmetic. We took the log of all the variables except Ump and wr. Reputed 
international organizations rarely publish regional level data. Therefore, we had to rely on 
a number of authentic agencies from USA, both in public and private sectors, for 
collection of data. The range of the data is from 2002 to 2011.  
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Table 1 presents the result of Im)Pesaran)Shin (2003) and Fisher (phillip)perron) 
panel unit root test. All the variables except CFDI and FXC are non)stationary at level. 
However, these variables become stationary after first differencing. Based on IPS and 
Fisher (pp), the decision of stationarity is consistent. Different level of stationarity of 
CFDI (FXC) and other variables of interest shows that we can not run cointegration test.  
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!5 
Variables Im,Peseran and Shin Fisher (Philip)perron) Decision 
Level First Difference Level First Difference 
SGDP 0.1320 0.0311** 0.1101 0.0000* I(1) 
WWS 0.6517 0.0002* 0.9507 0.0035* I(1) 
CFDI 0.0000*  0.0000*  I(0) 
FXC 0.0000*  0.0000*  I(0) 
SXT 0.9530 0.0000* 0.9990 0.0000* I(1) 
XTMC 0.9350 0.0000* 0.9986 0.0000* I(1) 
Ump 0.5380 0.1002*** 0.6452 0.0000* I(1) 
Wr 0.9570 0.0001* 0.9995 0.0000* I(1) 
*,** and *** significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent level respectively 
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Our results for Model 1, based on contemporaneous fixed effect panel estimation in 
table 2, shows that the effect of Chinese outbound investment (CFDI) on States growth 
(SGDP) is not significant while that of total States export (SXT) and level of employment 
(Ump) have significant impact on SGDP where one percent increase in State exports 
increase States GDP by 0.4 percent while a percent increase in unemployment reduces 
States GDP by 0.005 percent. However the result in Column 2 of table 2 for the role of 
Chinese investment changes when we replace CFDI by interaction variables FXC and 
SXT by XTMC. FXC has significant and positive, while the role of XTMC and Ump 
remained unchanged. The positive result for interaction variables negates the adverse 
impact of Chinese outbound FDI in US States.  
 
Result for Model 2 in column 3 and 4 indicate that the role of CFDI and FXC are 
insignificant and does not affect employment level. However, CFDI and FXC carry the 
expected negative sign. On the other hand the negative and significant relation of Ump 
with SGDP, WWS, SXT and positive relation with Wr depict that as the State GDP along 
with world GDP and States total exports increases, unemployment level in States 
decreases while Ump increases when Wr increases. One of the reasons that CFDI and 
FXC role in generating employment are insignificant is that most of the Chinese 
investment in the US preferred M&A on Greenfield investment. Therefore, the true 
impact of Chinese FDI in the US States is difficult to be captured.  
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47 
C 0.0170 
(0.000)* 
0.02534 
(0.000)* 
2.117 
(0.000)* 
2.4663 
(0.000) * 
)0.0388 
(0.013) * 
).0775 
(0.025)** 
SGDP   )35.8418 
(0.003)* 
)37.2916 
(0.012) ** 
2.5910 
(0.000) * 
2.7071 
(0.000)* 
CFDI )0.00161 
(0.133) 
 )0.0722 
(0.251) 
 0.0074 
(0.283) 
 
FXC  0.0021 
(0.033)** 
 )0.0959 
(0.162)  
 0.009 
(0.120) 
WWS 0.0046 
(0. 937) 
0.0005 
(0.998)  
)21.9188 
(0.000) * 
)22.1338 
(0.000) * 
0.7618 
(0.000)* 
0.7687 
(0.000)* 
SXT 0.0452 
(0.017)** 
 )6.1232 
(0.002)* 
   
XTMC  0.0443 
(0.015)** 
 )5.6900 
(0.003)* 
  
Uem )0.0054 
(0.000)* 
)0.0056 
(0.000)* 
    
Wr   0.4169 
(0.000)* 
0.4232 
(0.000)* 
0.0107 
(0.412) 
)0.0110 
(0.413) 
R2 0.69 0.70 0.84 0.84 0.60 0.60 
F)statistics 83.72 
(0.000) 
73.94 
(0.000) 
42.92 
(0.000) 
47.70 
(0.000) 
34.00 
(0.000) 
34.24 
(0.000) 
Tolerance 0.306 0.296 0.151 0.157 0.394 0.398 
VIF 3.26 3.37 6.27 6.33 2.15 2.51 
*,** significant at 1 and 5 percent level 
p values given in parenthesis are based on Heteroskedastic consistent t)statistics 
 
The results in columns 5 and 6 of table 2 capture the impact of Chinese FDI on States 
total export and interaction variables FXC on States export to rest of the world except 
China. The role of CFDI in SXT and FXC in XTMC is insignificant. This indicated that 
like employment level, Chinese FDI does not play role in States Export. Positive and 
significant impact of WWS shows that US States exports heavily depends on the growth 
of world economy where a one percent increase in world output increases States export 
by 0.7 percent.  
 
0),	#&	1	/
 Our analysis in the previous model based on contemporaneous non)dynamic fixed 
effects panel estimation assumed homogeneity across the States where heterogeneity was 
restricted only to intercepts. However, to measure causal relation, we relaxed the 
assumption of homogeneity in equation 4.12 and applied Nair)Reichet and Weinhold 
(2001) approach. A lag length of one is selected and the results are given in table 3.  
 
From results in table 3, the insignificant value of the mean estimated coefficient 
of the orthogonalized causal candidate shows that FXC does not affect GDP, while the 
significant values of reverse causality shows that GDP does affect FXC. However, the 
rest of the variables, based on the insignificant values of mean estimated coefficient, 
show no causal relation (Upper and lower bound estimation approach based on Kemal et 
al (2007) is given in appendix).   
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Model 1 
Estimated Coefficient 
Standard Error 
LB (Confidence Interval) 
UB (Confidence Interval) 
Est. Coefficient Variance 
89)90:
0.017 
8()99*
().00
0.015 
9);<.
0.201 
8()00.
9)0(*
0.073 
Model 2 
Estimated Coefficient 
Standard Error 
LB (Confidence Interval) 
UB (Confidence Interval) 
Est. Coefficient Variance 
89)9(9
0.038 
8()..0
()=,(
0.043 
9)9(.
0.042 
89);.(
9);((
0.032 
Model 3 
Estimated Coefficient 
Standard Error 
LB (Confidence Interval) 
UB (Confidence Interval) 
Est. Coefficient Variance 
9)=:(
0.0116 
8()(*(
()<:9
0.012 
89)((;<
0.032 
89)(,0
*)(<9
0.077 


:)		
This study analyzed the empirical relationship of Chinese outbound FDI on 
growth, employment and export of selected US States and reached to the conclusion that 
Chinese outbound FDI does not contribute to the growth, employment and export 
performance of the selected States, however, Chinese FDI significantly and positively 
affect growth prospects of selected States when it interacts with States exports to China. 
Similarly, the significant two)way causal relation of interaction variables with States 
GDP does not confirm the negative impact of Chinese FDI in the US. It is a fact that 
Chinese state owned firms are the major players who invest abroad but our results remind 
us of Japan bashing in1980’s by US lobbies when Japanese investment in the US was 
hugely criticized and considered to be the root cause of US economic adversaries 
contrary to the empirical evidence of positive role of Japanese investment. 
 
 Therefore, securing strategic interest on one hand but counting every Chinese 
penny invested in the US as a strategic move by an adversary will negatively affect the 
US economy, particularly in an environment where Chinese and US interdependence is 
increasing and US is badly in need of financing and emerging markets. Similarly, 
Chinese investors are needed to increase investment in Greenfield projects and avoid high 
profile acquisitions in order to avoid unnecessary attention. Though China and Japan 
relations are going though tough time these days, still China can learn a lot from the 
experience meted out to Japanese outbound FDI in the US during 1980’s.  
 

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New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, 
Washington, 
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Variables Description and Source 
SGDP Log value of States GDP, million dollars  
Buearue of Economic Analysis 
www.bea.gov 
WWS Log of World Gross Domestic Product minus US GDP Million  
US GDP and World GDP collected from World Bank WDI 
CFDI Log of Chinese FDI in selected States, millions dollars  
Data published by the Asia Society (An American Open Door? 
Maximizing the Benefits of Chinese FDI), compiled by Rhodium 
group 
FXC CFDI * SXT  (Interaction Variable) 
SXT Log values of States total exports, million dollars  
World Trace Center, New Orleans 
www.tcno.org/tradestats/staterankings.htm 
SXC Log values of States exports to China in million dollars  
The US China Business Council 
www.uschina.org/public/exports/2000_2011/full_state_report.pdf 
XTMC SXT)SXC(Interaction Variable) 
Ump Annual Unemployment Rate of States  
RI Department of Labor and Training 
www.dlt.ri.gov/lmi/laus/us/annavg.htm 
Wr Minimum wage rate of States 
US Department of Labor 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/state/stateMinWageHis.htm 
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SGPD SGDP CFDI WWS SXT Ump Wr 
SGP 1.0000      
CFDI 022827 1.0000     
WWS 0.0205 0.3398 1.0000    
SXT 0.7947 0.2892  0.3089 1.0000   
Ump )0.0014 0.3715  0.5424 0.1851 1.0000  
Wr 0.2551  0.3002 0.6406 0.4330 0.4772  1.0000 
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SGPD SGDP FXC WWS XTMC Ump Wr 
SGP 1.0000      
FXC 0.4987   1.0000     
WWS 0.0205    0.4722    1.0000    
XTMC 0.8021    0.5825  0.2925   1.0000   
Ump )0.0014    0.4130    0.5424  0.1743 1.0000  
Wr   0.2551    0.4984    0.6406    0.4099    0.4772  1.0000 
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We build confidence intervals around zero (the first element in the estimated 
vector 
;
θ  which is <=
;
θ  is tested to be zero) to test for the significance of the mean of the 
estimated coefficient on the causal variable. The lower and upper bounds are given below 
and the mean coefficient values within this interval are considered not different from zero. 
LB (Confidence Interval): 
<=<=
; <
;;>+=)  −− θσθ  
UB (Confidence Interval): 
<=<=
; <
;;>=  −θσθ  
